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MORTGAGE WAREHOUSINGA MISNOMER
Murdoch K. Goodwin t
Mortgage financing is usually more complex than a simple transaction between mortgagor and mortgagee. A typical financing situation
involves a mortgagor and three credit institutions: Mortgage Company il, Bank B and a permanent investor, often Insurance Company I.
After the creation of the mortgage but before it is transferred by Mortgage Company M, the original mortgagee, to Insurance Company I,
which will take it over as a permanent investment, time is required for
the completion of construction, recording of the mortgage, issuance of
title insurance, and the examination of the credit and legal aspects of
the mortgage loan, including review of the papers by the Federal
Housing Administration or the Veterans Administration. During this
interval, Bank B extends credit to Mortgage Company M in order that
M may make loans to other mortgagors.
Reliable authorities have estimated that the amount of credit extended by commercial banks to mortgage lenders such as Company M
more than doubled in the year following August, 1954. Of the total
credits outstanding in August, 1955, approximating $1,300,000,000,
over $900,000,000 represented loans to mortgage lenders intended to
be secured by the pledge of the mortgages thus created. Additional
unused commitments for loans or purchases aggregated $1,200,000,000.1
The growing volume of this credit is such that its significance is now
being examined by economists and those concerned with problems of
money and credit. Several aspects of these transactions should also be
a matter of concern to those interested in the legal arrangements.
Until comparatively recently, the interval of time between the creation of the mortgage and its acceptance by the permanent investor
generally approximated two to four months. The recent policy of
permanent investors to postpone their obligations on purchase commitments to periods as long as a year after the creation of the mortgages
exposes Bank B, as interim financer, to a multiplication of the risks
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involved in certain types of financing arrangements. Since the possibility is always present that the prevailing economic climate may
change, it should be emphasized that the essential purpose of the security arrangement in the mortgages should be the validity of the collateral position of Bank B against third parties and creditors of Mortgage Company M.
Such interim financing transactions may take the form of a purchase of the mortgage in exchange for an agreement of repurchase, or
they may retain the usual aspects of collateral security transactions.
Many variations may be employed when the transaction is in security
form, but a very popular one is the "mortgage warehousing" device.
Although the term "mortgage warehousing" is used to refer to all types
of lending and purchase commitments in the real estate mortgage market, in its narrower sense it signifies a loan by a commercial bank or
other lending institution to the owner of mortgages, the mortgages representing the security for the loan. A typical transaction takes the
following form:
1. Bank B appoints an employee of Mortgage Company M
as its "custodian" to hold in his control and for the account of
Bank B the notes or bonds of the mortgagors, the mortgages
securing those obligations, policies of title insurance, and such
other collateral papers as may be involved dealing with FHA
insurance, VA guarantee, etc. The bank may or may not pay
the salary of this "custodian."
2. Mortgage Company M executes and delivers to the "custodian" individual, unrecorded assignments of the mortgages which
remain in the name of M on the records in the recording office.
3. The "custodian" holds these documents in filing cabinets
located on the premises of Mortgage Company MW, where they are
not segregated from other furniture and equipment of M. The
cabinets may or may not bear identifying labels advising that:
"The documents contained herein are in the possession of the
custodian for the account of Bank B, to whom all right, title, and
interest of Mortgage Company M has been assigned," or words
to that effect.
4. Mortgage Company M executes and delivers to Bank B
an assignment of the commitments of the permanent investor.
Notice of the assignment may or may not be given by the bank
to Insurance Company I directing that payment of the purchase
obligations under the commitments be made to the bank.
5. During the period of the interim financing, Mortgage
Company M usually continues to receive amortization payments
on account of principal, taxes, interest and other obligations payable by the mortgagors. Such payments may be made by the
mortgagors as a natural consequence of the fact that the mortgages
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remain payable to M or by reason of a notice from Bank B, directing that such payments be made to M as the authorized agent
of the bank.
It is obvious that all such transactions will not exactly coincide
with this description since the totality of the arrangement comprises
many factors susceptible to variance. However, the essential elements
creating the hazards in the transaction are too widely practiced for
comfort. These include the retention of the mortgage documents in
the hands of the "custodian" on the premises of Mortgage Company
M and the failure to record the assignments of the mortgages to Bank
B. Bank B sometimes considers itself protected as a practical matter
because, from its examination of the financial statements of the mortgage company, it can assure itself of being the sole principal creditor
in the event of insolvency proceedings. On the other hand, Bank B
does not usually have any sure means of controlling the other commitments of its debtor, and the practice appears to be growing for
Mortgage Company M to maintain at least two such lines of credit
at different lending institutions.
THEORY OF FIELD WAREHOUSING

Those familiar with the traditional arrangement known as "field
warehousing" will notice the similarity and also the differences between
that arrangement and "mortgage warehousing" as described above. In
true field warehousing the transaction includes not only the appointment
of the custodian, but also the segregation of the commodities on a portion of the premises of the borrower which are then leased to the lender,
and the erection of conspicuous signs notifying the public and other
parties dealing with the borrower that the goods located on the leased
premises are the property of the lending institution.' The element of the
lease is intended as a substitute for physical delivery of the pledged
goods. The appointment of the custodian is intended to insure that
the "pledgee" actually maintains control over the goods, and he is
instructed that no goods may be removed without his prior consent.
The signs supply the answer to the still prevailing policy against the
validity of secret liens. Such an arrangement is said to be necessitated
by practical business considerations and was in fact an ingenious legal
method of making a pledge of commodities for which there was no
room in the vault of the bank because of their nature or their number.3
2. Kane, The Theory of Field Warehousing, 12 WAsH. L. REv. 20 (1937).
3. See Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 198 U.S. 530 (1905) (leather) ; Pittman v.
Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 118 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1941) (cottonseed) ; Commonwealth Trust Co. v. RFC, 120 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1941) (pig iron); Manufacturers
Acceptance Corp. v. Hale, 65 F.2d 76 (6ih Cir. 1933) (lumber) ; Philadelphia Warehouse Co. v. Winchester, 156 Fed. 600 (C.C.D. Del. 1907) (steel).
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Traditional field warehousing involves hazards which arise from
the required physical arrangements. While the identity of the custodian
as an employee of the borrower is not a determining factor, failure of
the custodian to exercise control will invalidate the arrangement.4
The fact that the premises are accessible to other parties militates
against the alleged dominion over the pledged property,' while if the
signs intended as notification to the public are in obscure locations,
the pledge is said not to be open and notorious.6
One outstanding difference between traditional field warehousing
and mortgage warehousing is the latter's lack of any notice to the
public except possibly the label on the filing cabinets. The absence
of a lease of any premises and lack of segregation of the "pledged"
mortgages is also significant. In addition, it should be noted that
Mortgage Company M often urges that the mortgages must stay in
its possession for purposes of having its billing clerks service the instalment payments to be made by the mortgagors. This plea is contradictory to the intent that the custodian maintain complete and exclusive
control over the documents. Such control would seem to be illusory
in these cases.
In addition to these risks, the few treatises on the subject limit
the use of "field warehousing" to commodities and goods of a nature
which are not readily susceptible of delivery.7 Section 6 of the Restatement of Security restricts the theory'to "bulky goods." 8 No authority has been found sustaining such an arrangement in the case of
documents which may easily be delivered to the files of a bank.
Furthermore, a state like Pennsylvania which has adopted the
Uniform Commercial Code has rejected the theory of field warehousing
of commodities by its notice filing system and has thereby destroyed any
basis for asserting that it is applicable to mortgage documents. 9 It
is now necessary under the Code for a secured party to obtain actual
4. See In re Rodgers, 125 Fed. 169, 178 (7th Cir. 1903), rev'd on other grounds
sub nora. First Nat'l Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 198 U.S. 280 (1905).
5. See Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415, 426 (1907) (hosiery
and raw materials).
6. See Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand, supra note 5, at 421; In re SpanishAmerican Cork Products Co., 2 F.2d 203 (4th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 634
(1925); American Can Co. v. Erie Preserving Co., 183 Fed. 96 (2d Cir. 1910).
7. See, e.g., Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 COLUM. L. Rav. 991 (1942);
Burman, Practical Aspects of Inventory and Receivables Financing, 13 LAW &
CONTEmp. PROB. 554 (1948) ; Koch, Econmnic Aspects of Inventory and Receivables
Financing, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 566 (1948); Birnbaum, Form and Substance
in Field Warehousing, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 579 (1948); 19 CALIF. L. REV.
333 (1931).
8. "A pledge of bulky goods can be created by an identification of the goods
and an assumption of control by the pledgee."
9. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-305; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-305
(Purdon 1954).
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physical possession of an instrument, such as the note or bond evidencing the obligation secured by the mortgage, before the lender can have
any security interest in that obligation."0
EXPOSURE UNDER OTHER APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES

If the theory of "field warehousing" is not applicable to support a
"pledge" of documents, it is necessary to consider the arrangement as
a case in which the appointment of the custodian has no effect whatever
and as if the "pledged" property consisting of bond, mortgage and
accompanying papers had continued in the possession of the borrowing
mortgage company. Whether such an arrangement will be recognized
as a security device must be examined under other applicable rules of
law.
State Law
The importance of ascertaining the decisions of the particular
state in which the arrangements are being carried out cannot be overemphasized. Such rulings are important not only because of their
influence upon problems which might confront the parties in the state
courts, but particularly because such decisions will govern the effectiveness of the "pledge" in the federal bankruptcy courts." The problem
is one of analyzing the nature of a mortgage transaction in the states
concerned, the effect of the recording statutes, and the effectiveness
of a "pledge" of mortgage documents without delivery, either with or
without recording.
Typical of cases in this area is Second National Bank v. Dyer.'2
There Mortgage Company M had obtained interim borrowing from
Bank B to which it delivered an unrecordedassignment of the mortgage
together with the note of the mortgagor which represented the obligation secured by the mortgage. Without repayment of the loan to B,
M executed and delivered to the permanent investor, I, a recorded
assignment of the mortgage together with the original mortgage and
a forged note purporting to represent the obligation. The Connecticut
court held that, since I had complied with the recording acts, it was
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. IZA, § 9-303(3) (Purdon 1954); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§9-303(3), 9-102(3), 9-105(g) (Supp. 1 1955); Funk, Problems of Classification under Article 9 of the Uniform Comnmercial Code, 102 U. PA. L. Rxv. 703
(1954).

11. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); McKenzie v. Irving Trust
Co., 323 U.S. 365 (1945); Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434

(1943) ; In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 835
(1947).
12. 126 Conn. 101, 9 A.2d 503 (1939); 6 U. P-rr. L. Rxv. 300 (1940).
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the legal owner of the mortgage. The court recognized that normally
the transfer to the bank of the mortgage obligation represented by the
note would have carried the mortgage with it, but held that application of such a rule would nullify the recording statute.
State decisions, such as the Dyer case, usually involve some element of fraud. While the possibilities of fraud are always discounted
before it occurs, the decisions are significant in determining the relationships of Bank B to third parties who have dealings with Mortgage
Company M.
The risk of loss of security facing Bank B under the arrangement
being discussed will be affected by considerations of state law inclusive
of the following:
(a) Whether a real estate mortgage represents title or only
a security interest in the premises."3
(b) Whether a mortgage may exist either without a note
or bond or separate and apart from the note or bond it secures.' 4
(c) Whether a transfer of the debt transfers the mortgage."
(d) The necessity of notice of an assignment to the obligor
on the mortgage.'
(e) Whether priority of time of assignment governs.' 7
(f) Rules of estoppel."
(g) Whether physical delivery of the bond, mortgage, 9 or
both is needed to perfect an assignment.
(h) Applicability of recording statutes.
State cases cannot be conveniently classified under these issues
since they are discussed by the courts in varying combinations and
with varying emphasis. For purposes of discussion, the conflict in
the decisions seems to resolve itself into the fundamental questions of
13. See Artisti-Kote Co. v. Benefactor B. & L. Ass'n, 64 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.
1933); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1380 (3d ed. 1939); Lloyd, The Mortgage
Theory of Pemsylvania, 73 U. PA. L. Rv. 43 (1924).
14. See Orman v. North Alabama Assets Co., 204 Fed. 289 (N.D. Ala. 1913);
Sanford v. Kane, 133 Ill. 199, 24 N.E. 414 (1890) ; Johnson v. Clark, 28 Atl. 558
(N.J. 1894); Ii re Pirie, 198 N.Y. 209, 91 N.E. 587 (1910); 5 TIFFANY, op. Cit.
supra note 13, § 1451; WALSa, MORTGAGES § 64 (1934).
15. See Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271 (1872); Mack v. Wetzlar,
39 Cal. 247 (1870); Waterbury Trust Co. v. Weisman, 94 Conn. 210, 108 Atl. 550
(1919); Morris v. Bacon, 123 Mass. 58 (1877) ; Roberts v. Halstead, 9 Pa. 32 (1848);
5 Tiffany, op. cit. supra note 13, § 1449.
16. See notes 35, 36 and 41 infra; Kinch v. Fluke, 311 Pa. 405, 166 Atl. 905
(1933) ; Foster v. Carson, 159 Pa. 477, 28 AtI. 356 (1894) ; Kisinger v. Pennsylvania
Trust Co., 119 Pa. Super. 16, 180 Atl. 79 (1935).
17. See notes 22, 23 and 25 infra.
18. See note 12 supra, and notes 22, 27 and 28 infra.
19. See notes 27 and 28 infra.
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whether recording of the assignment of the mortgage is sufficient to
protect Bank B, whether delivery of possession of the documents will
suffice, or whether both acts are required.
Necessity of Recording Assignment of Mortgage
In most states the recording statutes seem to be sufficiently comprehensive to permit or require the recording of an assignment of a
mortgage."0 It is said to be the general rule that such recording
affords protection against subsequent purchasers of the same mortgage
or encumbrancers of the real estate.2" In such jurisdictions the relative
rights of two buyers of the same mortgage seem to be determined by
which one first records the transaction. Failure to record may subject a first assignee to the rights of later purchasers of the mortgage or
encumbrancers of the real estate 2 2 on the same theory that subsequent
encumbrancers of real estate are said not to be subject to latent deThis rule has even been used to profenses or equities in real estate.'
tect purchasers of real estate, as in Landis v. Robacker 4 where the
unrecorded assignee of a mortgage permitted its assignor to dispose
of the pledged mortgages as he chose. Having obtained title to the
premises, the assignor sold them to an innocent purchaser who was
held thereupon to have acquired title to the real estate free and clear
of the secret, unrecorded assignment of the mortgage.2
Necessity of Delivery of Mortgage Documents
In some states the recording statutes are not sufficiently broad to
permit or require the recording of the assignment of a mortgage, and
20. 5 TIFFANY, op. ct. supr note 13, § 1457; Annots., 89 A.L.R. 171 (1934),
104 A.L.R. 1301 (1936).
21. See Taylor v. American Nat'l Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912);
International Bank v. Wilshire, 108 Ill. 143 (1883); Watson v. Wyman, 161 Mass.
96, 36 N.E. 692 (1894); Murphy v. Barnard, 162 Mass. 72, 38 N.E. 29 (1894);
Redin v. Branham, 43 Minn. 283, 45 N.W. 445 (1890); Pepper's Appeal, 77 Pa.
373 (1875); 5 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 1457.
22. See, e.g., Second Nat'l Bank v. Dyer, 126 Conn. 101, 9 A.2d 503 (1939);
Blunt v. Norris, 123 Mass. 55 (1877) ; Brooke v. Struthers, 110 Mich. 562, 68
N.W. 272 (1896); Greene v. Warnick, 64 N.Y. 220 (1876); Brownback v. Ozias,
117 Pa. 87, 11 Atl. 301 (1887).
23. See Dulin v. Hunter, 98 Ala. 539, 13 So. 301 (1893); Himrod v. Gilman,
147 Ill. 293, 35 N.E. 373 (1893); Sweetzer v. Atterbury, 100 Pa. 18 (1882);
Pryor v. Wood, 31 Pa. 142 (1858); Mott v. Clark, 9 Pa. 399 (1848); 5 TIFFANY,
op. cit. supra note 13, § 1456.
24. 313 Pa. 271, 169 Atl. 891 (1933).
25. Ordinarily, owners of real estate are said not to have any interest in the recording of an assignment of a mortgage other than to be entitled to make satisfaction
to the party from whom notification is received.

note 13, § 1457.

See 5 TIFFANY, op. Cit. supra
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the rules of assignment and pledge ordinarily observed in those states
28

would apply.

Despite the fact that the recording statutes may apply, recording
does not always seem to give complete protection, and the question
of the necessity of delivery of the mortgage documents has become important in some cases. It has been held that a first assignee who obtains
physical delivery of the mortgage documents without recording the
assignment prevails over a second assignee even though the latter
records his assignment.
The second assignee is said to be estopped
to deny the title of the first assignee on the ground that he should have
demanded delivery of the documents.
Even more closely allied to the "mortgage warehousing" arrangement is the result when the first assignee permits his assignor to retain
possession of the mortgage documents even though he records his assignment of mortgage. If this assignor makes a second assignment
to a bona fide purchaser who obtains delivery of the mortgage documents, the second assignee is said to prevail over the first assignment
regardless of the fact that the first assignment was recorded.28 The
reason for this result is clear if the obligation secured by the mortgage
is in the form of a negotiable note.29 But the same result has been
reached where the mortgage obligation was non-negotiable, either on
the theory of estoppel or that the ownership of the mortgage cannot
exist separate from the note, and its ownership follows the transfer of
the mortgage note or bond.30
Cases in various states are not altogether reconcilable, and it is
apparent that the same is true of cases within the same state.8' One
line of demarcation would appear to be whether the court will emphasize compliance with the recording act or whether it will place
greater importance on the legal theory that ownership of a mortgage
follows ownership of the obligation it secures, with the result that pos26. See Reeves v. Hayes, 95 Ind. 521 (1884); James v. Morey, 2 Cow. 246
(N.Y. 1823); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Harrison-Doddridge Coal & Coke Co., 89
W. Va. 659, 109 S.E. 892 (1921) ; WALSH, op. cit. supra note 14, § 63; 5 TIFFANY,
op. cit. supra note 13, § 1457.
27. See Brumbach v. McLean, 196 Pa. 321, 46 Atl. 418 (1900); Brumbach v.
Johnson, 187 Pa. 602, 41 Atl. 480 (1898); Roberts v. Halstead, 9 Pa. 32 (1848);
Richards Trust Co. v. Rhomberg, 19 S.D. 595, 104 N.W. 268 (1905); Fred Miller
Brewing Co. v. Manasse, 99 Wis. 99, 74 N.W. 535 (1898);

5 TIFFANY, op. Cit.

supra note 13, § 1457; WA.SH, op. cit. supra note 14, § 63.
28. See Wendling v. Aurelius-Swanson Co., 106 Okla. 63, 232 Pac. 932 (1924);
Landis v. Robacker, 313 Pa. 271, 169 Atl. 891 (1933); Wood v. Sparks, 42 S.W.2d
142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Note, The Negotiable Mortgage Controversy, 29 NEB.
L. REv. 606, 621 (1950).
29. Wendling v. Aurelius-Swanson Co., sipra note 28.
30. Wood v. Sparks, 42 S.W2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
31. Compare Brumbach v. McLean, 196 Pa. 321, 46 Atl. 418 (1900), with
Pepper's Appeal, 77 Pa. 373 (1875).
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session of the mortgage obligation becomes the deciding factor. The
degree of protection of Bank B, therefore, usually depends upon the
decisions of the state in which the mortgage borrower is located and
whether recording an assignment of mortgage is sufficient, whether
possession must be taken of the mortgage documents, or whether both
acts are required. Nice questions of conflicts of law may also arise.
Federal Bankruptcy Act
The state decisions will control in the more important determination by the bankruptcy courts of whether Bank B has sufficiently "perfected" its security interest in the "pledged" mortgages to the extent
required by the Bankruptcy Act.3
Bankers and other parties dealing in security interests were considerably relieved by the enactment of the 1950 amendment to section
60(a) of the Chandler Act which substituted, for property other than
real property, a "lien creditor test" in lieu of a "bona fide purchaser"
test.as Thus chattel mortgages and trust receipts perfected against
creditors by filing are now valid in bankruptcy even .though the debtor
may transfer good title to a purchaser. The result in Corn Exchange
National Bank v. Klauder3 4 would now be different under the state
law as it existed at that time, for while the law of Pennsylvania was
that failure of the assignee of accounts receivable to give notice to the
32. See note 11 supra; 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§ 60.39-.50 (14th ed. 1941).
33. "(a) (1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the
property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an
antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four
months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding
under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
"(2) For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, a transfer
of property other than real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered
at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such
property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could
become superior to the rights of the transferee. A transfer of real property shall
be deemed to have been made or suffered when it became so far perfected that no
subsequent bona fide purchase from the debtor could create rights in such property
superior to the rights of the transferee. If any transfer of real property is not so
perfected against a bona fide purchase, or if any transfer of other property is not
so perfected against such liens by legal or equitable proceedings prior to the filing
of a petition initiating a proceeding under this title, it shall be deemed to have been
made immediately before the filing of the petition.
"(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection shall apply whether
or not there are or were creditors who might have obtained such liens upon the
property other than real property transferred and whether or not there are or were
persons who might have become bona fide purchasers of such real property." 30
STAT. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a) (1)-(3) (1952) ; 3 COLLIER, op. cit.
supra note 32, § 60.38.
34. 318 U.S. 434 (1943) (assignee of accounts receivable did not notify obligors
and therefore assignments would not have been good against a hypothetical bona
fide purchaser from assignor) ; 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 32, § 60.48.
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obligors on the account made it possible for a bona fide purchaser of
those accounts to obtain good title," an attaching creditor of the assignor was and is still entitled only to those rights retained by the
assignor in the accounts. This conforms to the general rule.36
However, the generalization that a "lien creditor test" was substituted for the "bona fide purchaser test" in all cases is too broad,
since it was also the manifested intention of Congress that secret liens
which constitute only equitable liens under state law were not to be
recognized in bankruptcy. 7 If state law provides that an equitable
lien is not valid against third parties other than buyers from the debtor
in the ordinary course of trade until the delivery of an instrument of
assignment, 8 delivery of possession,3 9 filing or recording,4" or "other
like overt action," the equitable lien is not considered perfected in bankruptcy. "Other like overt action" presumably includes compliance with
a state requirement that notice be given to an obligor before an assignment of mortgage may be valid against creditors.41 It is to be noted
that under section 60(a) (3), it is still only the hypothetical possibility
that a bona fide purchaser or lien creditor be able to obtain a superior
title which prevents the perfection of the equitable interest. The actual
existence of such purchaser or creditor is- unimportant.4"
35. Phillips's Estate, 205 Pa. 515, 55 Atl. 213 (1903); cf.

RESTATE?,IENT,

CON-

TRacts § 173 (1932).

36. RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 172 (1932); 2 WrLLISTON, CONTRAcrs § 434
(rev. ed. 1936) ; Phillips's Estate, 205 Pa. 525, 55 Atl. 216 (1903).
37. ".

.

. (a) (6) The recognition of equitable liens where available means of

perfecting legal liens have not been employed is declared to be contrary to the
policy of this section. If a transfer is for security and if (A) applicable law requires
a signed and delivered writing, or a delivery of possession, or a filing or recording,
or other like overt action as a condition to its full validity against third persons
other than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade claiming through or under the
transferor and (B) such overt action has not been taken, and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable lien, then such transfer is not perfected
within the meaning of paragraph (2) of this subsection. Notwithstanding the first
sentence of paragraph (2) of this subsection, it shall not suffice to perfect a transfer
wlich creates an equitable lien such as is described in the first sentence of this
paragraph, that it is made for a valuable consideration and that both parties intend
to perfect it and that they take action sufficient to effect a transfer as against liens
by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract: Provided, however, That
where the debtor's own interest is only equitable, he can perfect a transfer thereof
by any means appropriate fully to transfer an interest of that character: And provided further, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to be contrary to
the provisions of paragraph (7) of this subdivision." 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. §96(a)(6) (1952).
38. Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951).
39. In re Helicopter Air Transport, 85 F. Supp. 918 (D.N.J. 1949).
40. Bridgewater v. Schaefer, 164 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1947); In re Cox, 132
F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1943); In re Burton, 120 F. Supp. 148 (D. Md. 1954); Hawkins
v. Dannenberg Co., 234 Fed. 752 (S.D. Ga. 1916). The unrecorded real estate
mortgage approved in Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916), would not now be
valid.
41. 3 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 32, § 60.48, § 60.50.
42. See note 33 supra.
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The equitable lien on negotiable instruments left with the borrower
by the lender was once recognized under Sexton v. Kessler,' but that
result was changed by the Chandler Act and is still invalid under the
1950 amendment.4" A parallel might well be drawn between that situation and the arrangement under discussion whereby Bank B as the
"pledgee" of mortgage obligations fails to require their delivery or fails
to record. The arrangement with Mortgage Company M is exposed
to the state decisions which hold that even though Bank B has recorded
an assignment of the mortgages, if it has permitted the mortgage documents to remain in the possession of the custodian (whose possession
may be meaningless by reason of the inapplicability of the field warehouse theory), its interest is subject to a transfer of good title by a
second assignment to a bona fide purchaser.4 5 Likewise, a failure to
record the assignment of the mortgages subjects Bank B to the posto
sibility that a bona fide purchaser without notice may acquire 4title
6
M.
Company
Mortgage
from
transfer
a
those mortgages under
It is necessary for lenders to determine whether recording or possession in a given state is sufficient protection or whether both recording and possession are required. Unless the required action is taken
more than four months prior to bankruptcy or unless other elements
of a preference are missing, the transfer will be deemed to have been
made immediately prior to the bankruptcy proceedings and will there47
fore be voidable as a preferential transfer.
The situation is even more serious in a state which holds that a
mortgage represents legal title to the real estate and that the assignment
of the mortgage is a transfer of real property.48 In such a jurisdiction
the "bona fide purchaser" test would apply under section 60(a) (2)
without first determining whether the interest of the assignee was only
an equitable interest under the law of that state.49
Mortgage Obligations Represent Accounts Receivable
The assignee or pledgee of a mortgage and its underlying note or
bond is exposed to a risk of loss of security even though the particular
transaction is recognized as a "valid" assignment or pledge. Whatever
theory is used to validate the "pledge," the holder of a note or bond
secured by a mortgage is to be regarded as the holder of a chose in
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

225 U.S. 90 (1911).
3 COLuER, op. cit. supra note 32, § 60.38.
See notes 28, 29 and 30 supra.
See note 22 supra.
See notes 33 and 37 supra.
See note 13 supra.
See note 33 supra.
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actionPr' A mortgage lien can exist only if there is an obligation under
a bond or note." A purported assignment of the mortgage without
the debt is said to be a nullity,"2 while the transfer of the debt is often
This analysis
said to constitute a transfer of the mortgage security.'
would require the assignee of the mortgage in most jurisdictions to consider the necessity of complying with requirements ordinarily deemed
applicable to the pledge or assignment of accounts receivable. In particular it is important to determine whether dominion and control have
been established and maintained by the "pledgee" over the amortization
payments if they are to be made by the mortgagor to Mortgage Company M. The rule of Benedict v. Ratner 4 is not exclusively applicable
to accounts receivable but has been applied to property of other types. 5
Even the delivery to the pledgee of the bond with its accompanying
mortgage and the recording of the assignment may be vitiated if the
assignee makes no attempt to control the disposition of the periodic
collections by its debtor on account of interest and principal on the
It is not a question of additional security only, for the
mortgage.5
entire transaction is otherwise voided. 7
Available Alternative Arrangemnents
This review may only confirm the present convictions of discerning persons. However, the lack of literature on the subject is a matter
of concern in the face of published statements which over-emphasize
50. 5 TIFANY, op cit. supra note 13, § 1412.
51. See note 14 supra.
52. Ibid.
53. See note 15 supra.
54. 268 U.S. 353 (1925); cf. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434
(1943) ; In re Rosen, 157 F.2d 997 (3d Cir. 1946) ; In re Pusey, Maynes, Breish
Co., 122 F2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941).
55. See Mount v. Norfolk S. & L. Corp., 192 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1951) (pledge
of conditional sales contracts invalid although possession delivered); In re Allied
Products Co., 134 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1943) (construction contract); McCance v.
D. A. Schulte, 91 F.2d 733 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 743 (1937) (assignment
of real estate leases); Manufacturers Finance Co. v. Armstrong, 78 F.2d 289 (4th
Cir. 1935) (sufficient dominion supported pledge of trade acceptances); Brown v.
Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926) (grocery stock and fixtures) ; In re Gruner's Estate,
54 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Surr. Ct), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 973, 59 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1st Dep't *
1945), rezvd o otlier grounds, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E2d 514 (1946) (attempted lien
on stock exchange seat invalidated due to power of pledgor to subject seat to debt
charges).
56. In re Prudence Co., 88 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1937) (dictum), affirming 15
F. Supp. 1064 (E.D.N.Y. 1936).
57. UNIFORM Coa EsClAL CODE § 9-205 changes the rule of Benedict v. Ratner
in Pennsylvania in so far as that case voided a pledge because of the power of the
debtor to use or dispose of collections from accounts receivable. See note 10 supra.
Furthermore, the amortization payments due under a mortgage are not included in
the definition of an account in the code. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-106.
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the convenience of permitting Mortgage Company M to retain possession of the mortgage documents. 8
There is still time for lenders to make an educated choice between
the alternatives of (1) accomplishing recording only, (2) taking possession of the mortgage documents without recording, (3) recording
an assignment and obtaining possession of all the mortgage documents,
or (4) taking possession of the mortgage obligation only and leaving
the mortgage in the hands of Mortgage Company M on the theory that
its ownership follows the mortgage obligation. The expense of recording an assignment for temporary periods is a practical obstacle
which may influence a decision to exercise one of the alternative possessive rights, which appear to be more protective than the mere act
of recording. Alternative number (4), of course, would not be available in a state which has already adopted the rule that possession of the
mortgage obligation separate from the mortgage does not afford protection unless recording is also accomplished."9
An additional alternative exists which under certain circumstances
may be even more practical. This consists of having the initial assignment of mortgage recorded in favor of the permanent investor
which in turn would agree to pay directly to Bank B the price stated
in its purchase commitment. Whether such assignment should be accompanied by the delivery of the mortgage papers to the permanent investor in the capacity of a custodian will depend upon the protection
afforded under state law by the mere act of recording or whether the
continued possession in Mortgage Company M could subject Bank B
or the permanent investor to the rights of an intervening bona fide
purchaser of the mortgage documents.
58. Redfield, "Warehousing" Helps Balance Mortgage Portfolios, Savings Bank
J., Aug. 1955, p. 10.
59. See, e.g., Second Nat'l Bank v. Dyer, 126 Conn. 101, 9 A.2d 503 (1939).
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